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ABSTRACT
 Antitrust analysis of online markets is a hot topic around the world.  In a number of 
jurisdictions, online markets already have been subject to antitrust review in merger or 
conduct cases.  In other jurisdictions, these issues are in a nascent stage of policy.  A 
number of lessons can be learned from the cases to date involving online markets with 
regard to optimal antitrust policy.  What these cases tend to share are some basic 
features as to how online markets work.  Some jurisdictions understand the particular 
dynamics of multi-sided online markets.  Other competition authorities sometimes may 
misidentify these markets.  This essay outlines five areas in which online markets may be 
different from traditional markets for antitrust purposes.  The essay also explores why 
such markets require a more careful consideration from antitrust authorities and courts 
in their respective antitrust analyses.
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I. MARKET DEFINITION IS MORE COMPLICATED AND COMPETITION ONLINE IS NOT ALWAYS 
LIKE FOR LIKE
¶1  Economic analysis helps to explain how to conceptualize competitive effects in 
online market antitrust cases. Yet, static analytical tools may have limitations when 
applying to multi-sided models simply because the price mechanism has been changed. 
Given these dynamics, a proper understanding of economics needs to play a role in online 
markets to determine any justifications for antitrust legal intervention.1
¶2  Online markets challenge traditional antitrust analysis because online services are 
often available to users for free. Instead of money, consumers provide attention and 
information that is often used to direct relevant advertising to those consumers. The 
economics literature refers to markets with more than one “side.”  A firm (or “platform”) 
that brings together distinct types of economic actors together to interact (e.g., online 
auctions, dating, search engines, and payment systems) operates in a multi-sided market.2
¶3  Competition in a multi-sided market may emerge not from one platform but across 
different types of platforms to attract users. For instance, Facebook competes with 
Google, Twitter and Apple for ad revenue, but it is also in direct competition with offline 
advertising such as TV and print ads. In this way, competition is not always like-for-like 
online. Often the free services being offered to the user may differ, though the advertisers 
consider these various services to be substitutes.3
¶4  Market definition is the first step of traditional antitrust analysis.  In one-sided 
markets, an increase in price or decrease in output provides guidance on how to 
undertake antitrust analysis using a traditional SSNIP test.  However, market definition is 
more complicated in a multi-sided market. 
¶5  In multi-sided markets, the use of market shares for market definition purposes is 
something that should be carried out very cautiously.  Understanding the multi-sided 
nature of internet markets is very important to market definition analysis.  If an antitrust 
authority (or court) misidentifies the multi-sided nature of the market, this creates 
problems in analyzing the competitive effects in such a multi-sided market.  
Consequently, market definition can be conducted incorrectly as it may focus only on one 
side of the market or may implicate a free product or service.  In such markets where the 
product or service is free, it is not possible to calculate a traditional market share as in a 
one-sided market because in a multi-sided market, one side of the market may subsidize 
the other side of the market.4
1 See David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust 
Analysis 35–36 (U. Chi. L. School, Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 627, 2013), 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=law_and_economics. 
2 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N 990, 991–93 (2003). For an overview of the multi-sided market literature, see David S. Evans 
& Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS VOL. 1 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, eds. 
2014).)
3 David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust 
Analysis, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 313, 316 (2013).
4 Elena Argentesi & Lapo Filistrucchi, Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: The 
Case of Newspapers, 22 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 1247, 1247-48 (2007).
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¶6  In such multi-sided markets, services provided through internet platforms are 
largely based on information.5 For example, internet search engines provide a free service 
to users, but monetize the free service through advertising related to the user query.6
How much to value personal attention may be different across users as consumers are not 
homogenous in their preferences.7  Such a focus on calculating market shares and 
drawing conclusions about competitive effects from only one side of the markets leads to 
suboptimal outcomes because of inefficiencies that it may create.  This may include 
situations where the competitive analysis does not consider the welfare of all groups on 
both sides of the market.8  The effects may be such that one side of the market might 
harm the other side of the market.  Alternatively, one side of the market might help the 
other side of the market.9  The nature of interdependencies across the multiple sides of 
the market has implications for traditional antitrust tools for market definition when not 
modified for a multi-sided market.  Thus, a traditional SSNIP test that focuses on only 
one side of the market leads to the conclusion that market definition and market power 
analysis will lead to errors in antitrust analysis.10
¶7  Instead, antitrust authorities and courts need to consider the interdependencies on 
the multi-sided platform.  In doing so, such decision-makers need to provide particular 
attention to non-price competition when participation in one side of the multi-sided 
market is free.  For example, if a platform would raise its price on one side, this may have 
an effect not merely on how many customers would leave that side of the platform but 
could also impact customers on the other side of the platform.11  In markets categorized 
by dynamic competition, competitive forces on one side of the market can have feedback 
effects on the other sides of the market.  As Evans and Noel explain, “The possibility of 
obtaining supracompetitive profits through certain business actions depends on the 
relationship between the two sides due to their interlinked demand and the nature of the 
competition on both sides. Profits on one side can be dissipated on the other side.”12
Thus, by not considering the positive feedback effects this may serve to either potentially 
significantly overstate or understate the size of the market. 
¶8  Courts and antitrust authorities around the world have recognized that the antitrust 
economics of multi-sided markets require a more nuanced market definition.  For 
5 Michael A. Salinger & Robert J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 46 
REV. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 25, 32-35 (2015).
6 See e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case 
Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 192-93 (2011).
7 Volker Benndorf, Dorothea Kübler & Hans-Theo Normann, Privacy Concerns, Voluntary 
Disclosure of Information, and Unraveling: An Experiment, 75 EURO. ECON. REV. 43, 52 (2015).
8 Evans & Schmalensee supra note 2 at 20.
9 Minjae Song, Estimating Platform Market Power in Two-Sided Markets with an Application to 
Magazine Advertising, 3-5 (Working Paper, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=190861; Ambarish Chandra & 
Allan Collard-Wexler, Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper 
Industry, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1045, 1046 (2009).
10 David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. REG.
325, 357-58 (2003).
11 See Evans, & Schmalensee supra note 2, at 3.
12 David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided 
Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 671 (2005).
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example, in the Microsoft/Skype merger, the General Court of the European Union found 
that the market share of 90 percent of the combined entity was not likely to create anti-
competitive effects.13  It did so in part because of the fast moving nature of the market 
and the fact that there was no exclusion of competitors.  Similarly, in Qihoo 360 v. 
Tencent,14 China’s Supreme People’s Court rejected a SSNIP analysis (where Tencent 
possessed a market share of over 85 percent) because an increase in price to the free side 
of the platform would mean a fundamental change to the business model of Tencent. A 
number of mergers that antitrust agencies have approved such as Facebook/WhatsApp15
and Microsoft/Skype16 also suggest that high market share in a multi-sided market setting 
is not indicative of market power.
¶9  The lesson from multi-sided market cases around the world is that antitrust 
authorities and courts should proceed cautiously with the use of market definition and 
market shares in the assessment of multi-sided platforms.17
II. SUCCESS MAY BE EPHERMERAL BECAUSE ENTRY BARRIERS ARE LOW
¶10 Online markets are constantly transforming. Indeed, online markets typically have 
innovative challengers against incumbents. Challengers may overtake incumbent firms 
through new ideas and technologies. In such settings, there are low entry barriers. Digital 
competition offers many examples, like Facebook, Snapchat, and Tinder, where a simple 
insight into customer needs enabled entry and rapid success.18 Other examples include 
WhatsApp, Snapchat and Instagram. They were far behind Facebook, but made inroads 
without a large user base. In addition, Yahoo leapfrogged AltaVista and Google 
leapfrogged Yahoo. Each search engines had separately been declared the “winner” of 
search at one time.19
13 8 Judgment in Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc. and Messagenet SpA v Commission, 11 
December 2013 at ¶52, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-79/12.
14 Beijing Qihoo Technology Co. Ltd. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. & Shenzhen 
Tencent Computer System Co., Ltd., Civil Judgment of Supreme People’s Court of China, 2013 Min San 
Zhong No. 4, entered October 8, 2014. 
15 Eur. Comm’n Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf. 
16 Eur. Comm’n Case No Comp/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype, (2011) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf. 
17 Florian Wagner-von Papp, Should Google’s Secret Sauce Be Organic, 16 MELBOURNE J. INT’L
L. 609 (2015); David S. Evans, Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market 
Power for Internet-Based Firms (Working Paper, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2746095.
18 Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition?, 11-14
(working paper 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705530.  
19 Old press releases calling winners in one area or the other demonstrate how hard it is to pick 
winners in digital. For example, Fortune declared in a 1998 article, “This much is clear: Yahoo! has won 
the search-engine wars and is poised for much bigger things.” Randall E. Stross, How Yahoo! Won the 
Search Wars, FORTUNE (March 2, 
1998),http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/03/02/238576/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/N8GY-CR6H]. 
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¶11 We see low barriers to entry in a number of markets. For example, Facebook has 
become a major competitor to YouTube in video visualizations in a very short period of 
time.20 Even one year ago, such an outcome seemed unlikely. This type of competition 
with low entry barriers is not unique. Another set of markets with low entry barriers often 
involve those that utilize so-called “Big Data.” Tinder, a company so new it had less data 
than competing dating websites, overtook its competitors with an innovation of swiping 
left or right to connect people. This was a simple innovation in the user interface. Tinder 
succeeded despite having less data than its rivals because it developed a product that 
attracted users who shared their information with the company. 
¶12 Consumers can share information with as many services as they like, but firms 
must develop valuable products and services in order to attract consumers. In some cases, 
more data does not translate into a better product as data is most relevant when it is about 
how a company and its consumers use its own product. Netflix was able to overtake 
Blockbuster even though Blockbuster had more customer data initially. Netflix used its 
data more effectively because Blockbuster operated each of its stores independently and 
did not focus its data efforts on collection of customer preferences. As such, Blockbuster 
could not effectively use customer preferences and information (because for example, 
even with all of its data, it did not have a good sense of what a customer’s first choice 
was if a movie was out, merely the choice of what the customer would ultimately rent). 
These are but a few examples of how competition may emerge quickly and in doing so 
displace incumbents. For all these companies, it was not the quantity of data that was 
relevant, rather the insights that they derived from the data they had and their ability to 
innovate.
¶13 The examples above suggest an important policy lesson–low entry barriers are a 
common attribute in online data markets.21 The data requirements of new competitors are 
far more modest and qualitatively different than those of more established markets.22
Little, if any, user data is required as a starting point for most online services. Instead, 
firms may enter with innovative new products that skillfully address customer needs, and 
quickly collect data from users, which can then be used towards further product 
improvement and success.23 As such, new entrants are unlikely to be at a significant 
competitive disadvantage relative to incumbents in terms of data collection or analysis.24
20 See Amy Gesenhues, Facebook, Helped by Autoplay, Passes YouTube for Desktop Video Views 
for First Time, MARKETING LAND (Oct. 14, 2014), http://marketingland.com/facebook-delivered-a-billion-
more-desktop-video-views-than-facebook-103778 [https://perma.cc/QG8Z-9T5N].
21 D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play in Regulating Big 
Data?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HIGH TECH (Roger D. 
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds.) (forthcoming Apr. 2017) (manuscript at 5) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723693 (“[T]he unique economic characteristics of 
data mean that its accumulation does not, by itself, create a barrier to entry, and does not automatically 
endow a firm with either the incentive or the ability to foreclose rivals, expand or sustain its own 
monopoly, or harm competition in other ways.”).
22 Darren S. Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data, ANTITRUST SOURCE,
1, 6–9 (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec14_tucker_12_16f.authcheckd
am.pdf.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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For example, in Facebook/WhatsApp, the European Commission noted that data sets 
should not have an impact in a market for online advertising because there are so many 
different sources of user data available on the web.25
¶14 Low entry barriers are not limited to the most developed high tech markets. Evans 
and co-authors have noted the importance of the development of smart apps in the 
developing world context because of poor telecom and cable infrastructure. In India they 
identify that the development of smart apps create significant market disruptions against 
more established internet companies, which in turn have disrupted traditional brick and 
mortar companies.26
¶15 Changes in technology such as cloud computing and the low cost to develop apps 
also decrease barriers to entry.27 These technological changes reflect that new 
competitors spring up all of the time across a number of different platforms–social media, 
instant messaging, general and vertical search to name just a few. The overall 
enforcement takeaway regarding barriers to entry is that they appear to be low in many 
online markets. Further, barriers differ from market to market. Thus, any generalization 
about barriers to entry across online markets may lead to mistaken inferences that may 
lead to over-enforcement and quash innovation. 
III. USER MULTI-HOME AND HAVE LOW SWITCHING COSTS
¶16  Traditionally, antitrust analysis is concerned about switching costs from one 
platform to another. However, in online markets, switching costs are often low because of 
multi-homing. That is, consumers use multiple search methods online in undertaking web 
searching.28 In doing so consumers switch easily from a general search engine to 
specialized vertical search engines and apps. As Wagner von Papp explains, “A 
significant proportion of searches are done on vertical search sites or apps (such as 
Amazon, Booking.com, eBay, Expedia, Kayak, TripAdvisor etc) or social networks 
(especially Facebook)–either instead of using general web search or in addition to it 
(multi-homing).”29
¶17  Take the example of someone who needs to book a flight from Hong Kong to 
Madras. A consumer can easily switch from a general search engine (e.g., Baidu) to 
another search engine (e.g., Google or Bing), a social network (Facebook or Tencent), a 
25 Facebook/WhatsApp, supra note 15.
26 Hemant K. Bhargava, David S. Evans, and Deepa Mani, The Move to Smart Mobile and its 
Implications for Antitrust Analysis of Online Markets, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. REV. 157, 172 (2016) (“These 
changes in consumer shopping behavior are resulting in a revolution in retail. Retail stores are developing 
‘omnichannel’ approaches that integrate physical stores, mobile apps, and websites to provide consumers 
with multiple choices of how to shop and buy.”).
27 Small and medium businesses using cloud technology to overcome their growth challenges 
grow 26% faster and deliver 21% higher gross profits. 85% believe that cloud enables their business to 
scale and grow faster. Small Business, Big Technology: How the Cloud Enables Rapid Growth in SMBs,
Deloitte, 1 (Sept. 2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Technology-
Media-Telecommunications/gx-tmt-small-business-big-technology.pdf.
28 Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A 
Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 194 (2013).
29 Wagner-von Papp, supra note 17, at 631.
Vol. 15:1] D. Daniel Sokol and Jingyuan (Mary) Ma
51
specialized travel search engine (Ctrip, Expedia, or Kayak), via website and/or app.  
Thus, any incentive that a firm may have to bias its search results would be significantly 
limited.30
IV. THERE IS A NEED TO ANALYZE ALL SIDES OF A MARKET WHEN EXAMINING A MULTI-
SIDED MARKET
¶18  Enforcing antitrust law in high-tech industries and online markets has become one 
of the most challenging legal tasks today.31 Distinct from traditional markets, online 
markets bring together multiple groups of users who can interact with each other within 
the platform. The platform is often multi-sided because the value to one group of 
consumers often depends on another group of users. 
¶19  Online markets may have different network effects–direct and indirect network 
effects. Each type of network effect has its own attributes. Direct network effects may 
matter for purposes of scaling up, such as Facebook or Skype where more users create 
bigger scale.32 However, indirect network effects work differently. Indirect network 
effects take place in situations where additional users improve the use of a product or 
service better, though not due to direct interaction across users. Rather, additional users 
allow a platform to determine what its users want via trial and error in search results. This 
in turn improves the quality of search results.33 Understanding the difference between 
direct and indirect effects helps antitrust enforcers to better understand a multi-sided 
market.
¶20  In a multi-sided market, all sides of the market need to be analyzed because the 
benefits of indirect network effects can only be achieved when multiple agents are 
coordinated, and participation of each agent is ensured.34 For example, in a one-sided 
market, consumers and producers are often considered as a whole, whereas in multi-sided 
platforms consumers with different preferences could be separated and treated as 
independent groups. The increasing use of the platform of one consumer group would 
create an externality to other groups; therefore, particular attention has to be paid to the 
indirect network externality at the demand side. Multi-sided platforms could substantially 
reduce transaction costs. Without a multi-sided platform, the “value-creating” interaction 
30 Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago School Teach About Internet 
Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 663, 676 (2012).
31 J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address Before the ABA Antitrust 
Section Fall Forum: Intel, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook: Observations on Antitrust and the 
High-Tech Sector 4-6, 8-10, 16-17 (November 18, 2010)  
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/intel-apple-google-microsoft-and-
facebook-observations-antitrust-and-high-tech-sector/101118fallforum.pdf
32 Even with direct network effects, such effects do not always prevent successful entry as 
Facebook was challenged by Instagram, WhatsApp and Snapchat.
33 Andres V. Lerner, The Role of 'Big Data' in Online Platform Competition 10-11 (working paper 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780.
34 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 2, at 2. 
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among multiple agencies could be extremely costly.35 Such effects do not create 
consumer lock-in in the presence of multi-homing and low switching costs. 
CONCLUSION
¶21  The case for antitrust intervention in online markets requires great caution because 
of a number of factors: proper market definition, accounting for possible low entry 
barriers, multi-homing and low switching costs, and the need for a proper analysis of all 
sides of a market. Often, multi-sided markets produce significant benefits to consumer 
welfare in what are dynamic and fast moving markets. Mistaken antitrust intervention in 
such markets threatens innovation. Given these significant concerns, antitrust authorities 
and courts should closely examine the facts of a particular case to ensure that facts and 
economic analysis align well with legal theories in multi-sided markets before bringing 
such cases. Further, the nature of multi-sided markets suggest that before deciding on 
potential remedies, an antitrust authority should reexamine the market to see if its 
particular dynamics have already changed. 
35 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-
Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 158 (2007). 
